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DIVERSITY JURISDICTION-LIMITED PARTNERSHIPs-The United
States Supreme Court held that, for purposes of diversity jurisdic-
tion, the citizenship of each member of a limited partnership, both
limited and general partners, must be considered.
Carden v Arkoma Associates, - US -, 110 S Ct 1015
(1990).
Arkoma Associates (hereinafter, "Arkoma") was a limited part-
nership organized under Arizona law.' Two of Arkoma's general
partners were citizens of Arizona, and two others were citizens of
Oklahoma. The membership of Arkoma also contained one limited
partner who was a citizen of Louisiana.'
An agreement was executed between Arkoma and MaGee Drill-
ing Company (hereinafter, "MDC"), a Texas corporation, whereby
Arkoma leased two drilling rigs to MDC.' C. Tom Carden and Leo-
nard L. Limes, both citizens of Louisiana,' personally guaranteed
MDC's obligations under the lease.6 MDC failed to make its pay-
ments under the lease and Arkoma accelerated the payments.7
Arkoma brought suit against Carden and Limes as MDC's guar-
antors in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana.' Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citi-
zenship.' The defendants, Carden and Limes, moved the court to
1. Carden v Arkoma Associates, - US -, 110 S Ct 1015, 1016 (1990). On ap-
peal from the district court's judgment in favor of Arkoma, appellants maintained that the
district court had erroneously found Arkoma to be a limited partnership. Although not all
aspects of Arizona law had been complied with, the district court found that Arkoma had
"in good faith, substantially complied with the provisions of the statute, and therefore [was]
a valid limited partnership under Arizona law." Arkoma Associates v Carden, 874 F2d 226,
228-29 (5th Cir 1988). The Fifth Circuit found no error of fact or law in the finding of the
district court. Arkoma Associates, 874 F2d at 229.
2. Id at 228.
3. Id.
4. Id at 227-28.
5. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1016.
6. Arkoma Associates, 874 F2d at 228.
7. Id. Upon notification by MDC that it could not meet its obligations to creditors,
MDC tendered, and Arkoma accepted, physical possession of the rigs but reserved its rights
under the lease. Id.
8. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1016. Although MDC's president, Don MaGee, signed the
lease in question, he was not made a party-defendant in the suit. Arkoma Associates, 874
F2d at 228, n.1.
9. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1016. The relevant portions of the diversity jurisdiction stat-
ute, codified in 28 USC § 1332, are as follows:
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dismiss the action for lack of diversity jurisdiction on the ground
that their citizenship was the same as that of Arkoma's limited
partner.'0 The district court denied the motion but certified the
jurisdictional question for interlocutory appeal, which the Fifth
Circuit declined." MDC intervened on behalf of the original de-
fendants and collectively counterclaimed against Arkoma.' s Judg-
ment was awarded to Arkoma, and the defendants' counterclaim
and intervention were dismissed."' Carden, Limes, and MDC ap-
pealed, raising the issue of whether Arkoma had properly invoked
diversity jurisdiction.1
4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, finding
no error in the district court's determination that Arkoma was in
fact a limited partnership,"' affirmed the lower court's finding that
the requirements of diversity jurisdiction were satisfied.' Citing
Navarro Savings Association v Lee' and Mesa Operating Limited
Partnership v Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corporation,8 the Fifth
§ 1332. Diversity of citizenship; amount in controversy; costs
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between -
(1) citizens of different States;
(c) For the purposes of this section . . . (1) a corporation shall be deemed to be a
citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has
its principal place of business....
28 USC § 1332 (West 1988).
10. Arkoma Associates, 874 F2d at 228.
11. Id.
12. Id. The counterclaim alleged violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act resulting from alleged misrepresentations made by Arkoma regarding its drilling rigs.
Id.
13. Id. Arkoma's judgment amounted to $467,806.25 plus interest and attorney's fees.
Id.
14. Id. Other issues raised on appeal involved the district court's allegedly erroneous
findings that Arkoma had not acted fraudulently, that Arkoma had been entitled to repos-
sess its drilling rigs and at the same time accelerate the rent payments, and that the defend-
ants' counterclaim was unsubstantiated. The Fifth Circuit affirmed each of these findings.
Id at 230.
15. See note 1.
16. Arkoma Associates, 874 F2d at 229.
17. 446 US 458 (1980). In Navarro, the Supreme Court held that the citizenship of
the trustees of an express business trust, rather than that of the beneficiaries, was determi-
native of diversity jurisdiction. The Court found that because the trustees held legal title of
the trust, managed the assets, and controlled the litigation, the trustees were the "real par-
ties to the controversy." Navarro, 446 US at 465. See notes 131-47 and accompanying text
for a more detailed discussion of Navarro.
18. 797 F2d 238 (5th Cir 1986). In Mesa, the Fifth Circuit applied the reasoning in
Navarro to a situation involving a limited partnership. Concluding that the general partners
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Circuit held that the citizenship of the general partners deter-
mined the citizenship of the partnership."
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the sole issue
to be decided was whether the citizenship of limited partners must
be considered for the purpose of determining whether diversity ju-
risdiction exists. 0
The Court" first stated that, since its enactment, the diversity
statute22 has been interpreted to require "'complete diversity' of
citizenship. ' 2 The Court began its analysis by asking two ques-
tions to determine whether the district court's finding that diver-
sity jurisdiction existed was correct: (1) whether "a limited part-
nership may be considered in its own right a 'citizen' of the State
that created it, or (2) [whether] a federal court must look to the
citizenship of only its general, but not its limited, partners to de-
termine whether there is complete diversity of citizenship."2 '
Addressing the first question, the Court recognized the "firmly
established" rule that corporations are deemed "citizens" of their
state of incorporation." The Court emphasized that it had repeat-
edly refused to extend that treatment to other entities for purposes
of the diversity statute. 6
were "the real parties to the controversy," the court held that only their citizenship was to
be considered for diversity jurisdiction purposes. Mesa, 797 F2d at 243.
19. Arkoma Associates, 874 F2d at 228. This writer is ignorant of the reason why the
Fifth Circuit couched its holding in the terms of a partnership possessing "citizenship."
Unlike corporations, long deemed to be "citizens" (see notes 75-80 and accompanying text),
partnerships have never authoritatively been deemed "citizens" and so this writer cannot
understand how a partnership can possess "citizenship." The same is true regarding busi-
ness trusts: they have never authoritatively been deemed "citizens." See note 134 and ac-
companying text.
20. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1016. Arkoma also urged the Supreme Court to affirm the
judgment below as against MDC, asserting that no doubt existed as to those parties' diverse
citizenship. The Court refused to do so in the first instance, because that point was not
raised with the appellate court below. Id at 1022.
21. The majority opinion was written by Justice Scalia, in which Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy joined.
22. See note 9 for relevant portions of the diversity statute.
23. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1017 (citing Strawbridge v Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267, 2 L Ed 435
(1806)). Strawbridge is discussed further at notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
24. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1017.
25. Id at 1018.
26. Id. As examples, the Court cited Chapman v Barney, 129 US 677 (1889), Great
Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v Jones, 177 US 449 (1900), and United Steelworkers of
America, AFL-CIO v R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 US 145 (1965).
None of these cases involved a limited partnership: Chapman involved an unincorporated
joint-stock company; Great Southern involved a limited partnership association; and Bouli-
gny involved an unincorporated labor union.
Particular relevant excerpts from the Court's opinions in these cases are quoted in
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The Court conceded that it made an exception to the rule in
Puerto Rico v Russell & Co.,' 7 where the Court treated a sociedad
en comandita as a citizen of Puerto Rico to determine federal ju-
risdiction.28 The Court, however, distinguished Russell as a pecu-
liar situation involving an "'an exotic creation of the civil law'"
and its relationship to "a federal scheme which knew it not.' 9 .
The Court then addressed their decision in Navarro,30 which
Arkoma claimed applied to the present situation.3 ' The Court
stated that Navarro contained an issue entirely different from that
presented in Carden, and thus did not apply.3 2 The situation
presented in Navarro involved natural persons who were undoubt-
edly citizens, and involved the question of which of those citizens
Carden. From Chapman, the Court quotes: "'But the express company [unincorporated
joint-stock company] cannot be a citizen of New York, within the meaning of the statutes
regulating jurisdiction, unless it be a corporation. The allegation that the company was or-
ganized under the laws of New York is not an allegation that it is a corporation.'" Carden v
Arkoma Associates, 110 S Ct at 1018 (quoting Chapman, 129 US at 682 (emphasis in
original)).
Regarding its Great Southern opinion, the Court states: "[Wie held that a 'limited part-
nership association'-although possessing 'some of the characteristics of a corporation' and
deemed a 'citizen' by the law creating it-may not be deemed a 'citizen' under the jurisdic-
tional rule established for corporations." Carden, 110 S Ct at 1018 (quoting Great Southern,
177 US at 456).
Although the Supreme Court itself has never termed it as such, the incorporated/unincor-
porated dichotomy established in these three cases has become known as the "bright-line"
test in law review commentary and circuit court cases.
These cases are discussed in greater detail at notes 89-108 and 117-30 and accompanying
text.
27. 288 US 476 (1933).
28. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1018. A sociedad en comandita is an association organized
under the laws of Puerto Rico. Russell, 288 US at 477. It differs from a limited partnership
in that, under the law which created it, the sociedad is considered as a "juridical person"
and given the same characteristics of a corporation. Id at 481-82.
Note that, in Russell, the sociedad was not deemed a citizen for diversity jurisdiction
purposes, but for federal jurisdiction purposes. As notes 109-16 and the accompanying text
discuss, Russell involved the Organic Act of Puerto Rico and not the diversity statute.
29. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1018 (quoting Bouligny, 382 US at 151). In response to
Arkoma's argument that Russell showed the Court's willingness to move beyond the incor-
porated/unincorporated dichotomy, the Court answered:
There could be no doubt, after Bouligny, that at least common-law entities (and
likely all entities beyond the Puerto Rican sociedad en comandita) would be treated
for purposes of the diversity statute pursuant to what Russell called "[tlhe tradition
of the common law," which is "to treat as legal persons only incorporated groups and
to assimilate all others to partnerships."
Carden, 110 S Ct at 1018 (quoting Russell, 288 US at 480).
30. 446 US 458 (1980).
31. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1019. See note 17.
32. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1019.
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were real parties to the controversy.3 In contrast, the situation
presented in Carden involved a limited partnership, and involved
the question of whether that association could be treated as a cor-
poration for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.3 4 The Court distin-
guished the two cases by pointing out that the trustees in Navarro
sued in their own names while Arkoma, a limited partnership,
brought suit in its own name.35 The Court in Navarro only estab-
lished that the trustees were
'active trustees whose control over the assets held in their names is real and
substantial,' thereby bringing them under the rule, 'more than 150 years'
old, which permits such trustees 'to sue in their own right, without regard to
the citizenship of the trust beneficiaries. ' "
Thus answering its first question in the negative-that a limited
partnership cannot be considered a "citizen" of the state that cre-
ated it-the Court turned to its second question, whether the citi-
zenship of a limited partnership's general partners is solely deter-
minative of diversity jurisdiction.
Again pointing to the Chapman, Great Southern, and Bouligny
decisions, the Court emphasized that all members' citizenship of
those entities involved were taken into consideration to determine
diversity jurisdiction. 7 Relying on those cases, the Court held that
the citizenship of all members of a limited partnership, both lim-
ited and general partners, must be considered in determining
whether diversity jurisdiction exists.
38
The majority took notice of "the changing realities of business
organization," and stated that because limited partnerships are not
so functionally different from corporations, the incorporated/unin-
corporated dichotomy is no longer backed by sound policy rea-
sons."' But, because Congress had already taken a step in revising
the jurisdictional statute to provide that a corporation should be
deemed a citizen of its state of incorporation as well as its princi-




36. Id (quoting Navarro, 446 US at 465-66).
37. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1019-20. The Court stated: "No doubt some members of the
joint stock company in Chapman, the labor union in Bouligny, and the limited partnership
association in Great Southern exercised greater control over their respective entities than
other members. But such considerations have played no part in our decisions." Id at 1020.
38. Id at 1021.
39. Id at 1021-22.
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versity statute to Congress.40 Until then, the Court would "adhere"
to the rule that diversity jurisdiction involving an unincorporated
association depends on the citizenship of each member;41 in cases
involving a limited partnership, the citizenship of both limited and
general partners must be considered for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction.
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor' began her discussion by stat-
ing that the majority had no need to defer to Congress for rule-
making, because the majority had just formulated the new rule
that all members of an unincorporated association, without any
analysis of the particular association itself, must be counted for
diversity jurisdiction purposes.'
The dissent stated that "complete diversity" between parties is
not always required, such as in class actions under FRCP 23, or in
matters involving parties joined under ancillary jurisdiction, or
statutory interpleaders."4 Rather, the Court has always considered
whether the parties before them were real parties to the contro-
versy before determining whether diversity jurisdiction was satis-
fied.'5 This preliminary investigation into which parties are the
40. Id at 1022.
41. Id at 1021.
42. Justice O'Connor was joined in her dissent by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun.
43. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1023. The dissent stated the Court had previously formu-
lated rules concerning diversity jurisdiction in Navarro and Bouligny. Id.
44. Id. In class actions under FRCP 23, only the citizenship of the class representa-
tives are taken into consideration. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1023. The dissent cited Owen Equip-
ment & Erection Co. v Kroger, 437 US 365, 375, and n.18 (1978), in which the citizenship of
parties joined under ancillary jurisdiction was not considered. Also cited was State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v Tashire, 386 US 523, 530-31 (1967), where a statutory interpleader
was not considered for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. The Court held that diversity was
satisfied as long as there was diversity between two or more of the claimants. Carden, 110 S
Ct at 1023-24.
45. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1024. Cases cited by the dissent are Wormley v Wormley, 8
Wheat 421, 5 L Ed 651 (1823), in which the Court stated: "This court will not suffer its
jurisdiction to be ousted by the mere joinder or non-joinder of formal parties; but will rather
proceed without them, and decide upon the merits of the case between the parties, who have
the real interests before it, whenever it can be done without prejudice to the rights of
others." Id at 451 (footnote omitted); and Wood v Davis, 18 How 467, 469, 15 L Ed 460
(1856), wherein the Court stated: "'It has been repeatedly decided by the [Clourt, that
formal parties, or nominal parties, or parties without interest, united with the real parties to
the litigation, cannot oust the federal courts of jurisdiction ... ' Carden, 110 S Ct at 1024.
The dissent also cited Marshall v Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 16 How 314, 14 L Ed 953
(1854), and United States v Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, 3 L Ed 38 (1809), in which the dissent
claims a two-part test was applied by the Court: "(1) is the corporation a 'juridical person'
which can serve as a real party to the controversy . . .; and (2) are the shareholders real
parties to the controversy." Carden, 110 S Ct at 1024.
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real parties to the controversy has historically been a "necessary
prerequisite" to the determination of whether diversity jurisdiction
exists."'
Citing the same three cases the majority relied upon-Chapman,
Great Southern, and Bouligny-the dissent claimed that the Court
in those cases did not need to inquire which parties before it were
the real parties to the controversy, because the associations in-
volved were not themselves citizens and the members of the as-
sociations were equally situated in terms of power and control over
the assets, business, and litigation of the association.
47
In Navarro, Justice O'Connor continued, the Court unanimously
applied the "real party to the controversy" test to determine if di-
versity existed, because the beneficiaries of the trust lacked control
over the business of the trust as well as over the litigation.'8 Had
the Court considered the nature of the party named in the suit, as
the majority in Carden suggested, then the discussion of which
parties were the real parties to the controversy in Navarro was
"wholly superfluous."" This is especially so, said the dissent, con-
sidering that the beneficiaries were not even named in the suit, yet
were subjected to the "real party to the controversy" test."° Thus,
the dissent concluded, Navarro required the application of the
"real party to the controversy" test.
Justice O'Connor stated that a limited partnership is similar to a
business trust in that one class of members has the power, and the
other class cannot control any aspect of the business, its assets, or
the litigation." Applying the "real party to the controversy" test
used in Navarro to the limited partnership involved in Carden,
only the citizenship of the general partners of Arkoma is determi-
native of diversity jurisdiction.52 Noting that most states have
adopted the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, which precludes a
limited partner from judicial proceedings regarding the partner-
ship, the dissent stated that use of the "real party to the contro-
versy" test would result in uniformity because limited partners
would not be considered for diversity jurisdiction purposes.85
46. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1025 (interpreting Marshall, 16 How 314, 14 L Ed 953
(1854)).
47. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1025.
48. Id at 1026.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id at 1026-27.
52. Id at 1026.
53. Id at 1027. Section 26 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1976) states that
1991
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The dissent stated that perhaps one factor that led to the hold-
ing of the majority was their fear of overburdening federal court
dockets." The dissent claimed that this fear is groundless because
unincorporated associations may evade the Court's holding by
bringing a class action under FRCP 23, in which case the citizen-
ship of the class members would be irrelevant for diversity juris-
diction purposes."
Despite the majority's attentiveness to the Russell case, the dis-
sent found that case not directly related to the issue of whether a
limited partner's citizenship is to be considered for diversity pur-
poses.66 The issue in Russell was whether the suit could be re-
moved to the United States District Court for Puerto Rico from
Puerto Rico's Insular Court because neither side contained a party
who was a citizen of Puerto Rico."7 The dissent stated that the
majority's attempt to distinguish Russell was "seriously flawed."5 8
Although Russell presented an issue different from that in Carden,
the dissent found no reason to treat the two entities differently,
because a sociedad en comandita and a limited partnership are
virtually the same in form and function." The dissent concluded
by stating that the dissimilar treatment of the two associations "is
justified neither by our precedents nor by historical and commer-
cial realities." 60
The federal courts are granted their judicial power in Article III
of the United States Constitution." Article III states, in pertinent
part, that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend. . . to Controversies
...between Citizens of different States.. ..
Congress first authorized the federal courts to exercise diversity
jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789.8 The modern diversity
a limited partner "is not a proper party to proceedings by or against a partnership, except
where the object is to enforce a limited partner's right against or liability to the partner-
ship." Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 26 (1976).
54. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1027.
55. Id. See note 44 and accompanying text.
56. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1027.
57. Id.
58. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1027.
59. Id at 1028.
60. Id. The dissent noted that both the limited partnership and the sociedad en co-
mandita originated in the civil law, and both are descendants of an ancient French associa-
tion. Id.
61. US Const, Art III, § 2, cl 1.
62. Id.
63. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 11, 1 Stat 78. Section 11 states in pertinent part:
Sec. 11. And be it further enacted, That the circuit courts shall have original cogni-
zance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at
380 Vol. 29:373
Recent Decisions
jurisdiction statute is codified in 28 USC § 1332 (1988).",
The traditional theory advanced for the establishment of diver-
sity jurisdiction is that it serves to protect non-residents from real
or imagined prejudices by state courts. 6 Advocates of limiting or
abolishing diversity jurisdiction claim that this basis for federal ju-
risdiction is no longer necessary in modern times, and also costly
because of the large number of diversity cases in federal courts."
Other reasons advanced for reducing the jurisdiction of the federal
judiciary over diversity cases are that federal judges are not au-
thoritative on state law, which must be applied; federal courts in-
terfere with the autonomy of a state in applying its laws; and fed-
eral jurisdiction reduces incentive to reform a state's judicial
system. 7 Defenders of diversity jurisdiction offer seemingly valid
reasons as well for its continued present existence: state court
prejudices against non-residents still exist; the Constitution guar-
antees the citizens of each state all the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the several states; the federal judges' constitutional
guarantees of life tenure and undiminished salary result in "better
justice;" and that the availability of a federal forum encourages
capital investments by enterprises not local and leads to economic
growth of the nation as a whole." While the debate on whether or
not to retain diversity jurisdiction is lively, it is doubtful that the
question will be resolved in the near future."
Strawbridge v Curtiss70 was the first case before the United
States Supreme Court requiring an application of the diversity
common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the
sum or value of five hundred dollars, and . . . the suit is between a citizen of the
State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State. ...
The Constitution established only the Supreme Court, and left the establishment of "in-
ferior Courts" to the discretion of Congress. US Const, Art III, § 1. When Congress enacted
the Judiciary Act of 1789, it created the lower federal courts and defined their jurisdiction.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 1.2 at 8 (Little, Brown and Company 1989).
64. See note 9 for relevant portions of the diversity statute.
65. Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 5.3.2 at 242 (cited in note 63). But see,
Henry Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 Harv L Rev 483 (1928),
wherein Judge Friendly offers the alternative theory that diversity jurisdiction resulted from
the fear of what state court hostility could do to commercial interests.
66. Charles Alan Wright, Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts § 23 at 133 (West,
4th ed 1983).
67. Wright, Federal Courts § 23 at 133 (cited in note 66).
68. Id.
69. See Wright, Federal Courts (cited in note 66): "Any proposal to modify diversity
meets immediate organized opposition from those who believe that they have a vested inter-
est in preserving, for their own advantage, the widest possible choice of forum." Id at 92.
70. 7 US (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
1991
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statute. In Strawbridge, the complainants were alleged to be citi-
zens of Massachusetts.7 ' All but one of the defendants were also
alleged to be citizens of Massachusetts; Curtiss, the named defend-
ant, was alleged to be a citizen of Vermont.72 The complainants'
bill in chancery was dismissed by the circuit court for lack of juris-
diction.73 The Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the circuit
court, holding that complete diversity must exist.1
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Louisville, Cincinnati,
and Charleston Railroad Co. v Letson,76 corporations have been
considered citizens of their state of incorporation for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction. In Letson, a citizen of New York brought
suit, in the district court of the United States for the District of
South Carolina, against the railroad company, a corporation lo-
cated in South Carolina.7 ' The railroad company filed a plea to the
jurisdiction, alleging that some members of the corporation were
citizens of New York," thus destroying complete diversity. The
circuit court sustained the plaintiff's demurrer to the plea, and af-
ter trial the jury found for the plaintiff.7 8 On writ of error, the Su-
preme Court considered the issue of whether a corporation can be
considered a citizen for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.7 0 The
Court held that a corporation is to be deemed a citizen of its state
of incorporation because, although not a natural person, it has
qualities and abilities of a citizen for purposes of suing and being
sued.8 0
Ten years later, the Court reached substantially the same result,
but by way of a different theory. In Marshall v Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Co., 8" the Supreme Court held that the members of
a corporation are, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, to be con-
clusively presumed to be citizens of the state of incorporation. 2




75. 43 US (2 How) 497 (1842).
76. Letson, 2 US at 497.
77. Id at 497-98.
78. Id at 498.
79. Id at 552.
80. Id at 555. In so holding, the Court departed from its previous decision in Bank of
United States v Deveaux, 9 US (5 Cranch) 61 (1809), in which the Court stated: "That
invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere legal entity, a corporation aggregate, is
certainly not a citizen; . . ." Deveaux, 9 US at 86.
81. 57 US (16 How) 314 (1853).
82. Marshall, 57 US at 328-29.
Vol. 29:373
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The Court reasoned that those seeking to sue a corporation have
dealt not with the fictitious entity itself, but with real and natural
persons which the corporation represents.88 The representative ca-
pacity of the corporation, as established by state law for the conve-
nience of its members, cannot be used against those seeking to vin-
dicate their rights to deprive them of an impartial forum in federal
court." The Court stated that, for equitable reasons, members of a
corporation should be estopped from declaring a domicile other
than the state of incorporation." Otherwise, a corporation could
avoid being sued simply by choosing directors residing in different
states.86
Congress made the next move by amending to the diversity stat-
ute, which had provided that, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction,
a corporation is deemed to be a citizen of its state of incorpora-
tion,87 to also include that for purposes of diversity, a corporation
is deemed a citizen of the state where it has its principal place of
business.8 8
In two cases following Marshall, the Court had to decide
whether certain entities other than corporations could invoke the
jurisdiction of a federal court under the diversity statute. In Chap-
man v Barney,8 the United States Express Company, averred to
be a joint stock company organized under the laws of New York,"
brought suit, on the basis of diversity, against an Illinois citizen in
83. Id at 327-28.
84. Id at 327. The Court stated that citizens of one state, involved in a controversy
with citizens of another state, are guaranteed the right or privilege of access to an impartial
federal court by Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, and that "[s]tate laws, by combin-
ing large masses of men under a corporate name, cannot repeal the Constitution." Id at 326-
27.
85. Id at 328.
86. Id.
87. 72 Stat 415 (1958), 28 USC § 1332(c) provides: "For the purposes of this section
and section 1441 of this title [relating to actions removable] a corporation shall be deemed a
citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its
principal place of business." 28 USC § 1332(c) (1988).
The wording of the statute makes it clear that Congress adopted the Court's approach in
Letson and not Marshall, in which the Court held that the shareholders of a corporation are
to be presumed to be citizens of the state of incorporation. See discussion of Marshall be-
ginning at note 81.
88. 28 USC § 1332(c)(1) (1988). It is sometimes difficult to determine a corporation's
principle place of business. Courts have looked at different factors to answer this question,
such as where most of the corporate policy is formulated; where most of the corporation's
assets are located; where most of the corporate activity takes place; or where the corporate
headquarters are located. Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 5.3 at 250 (cited in note 63).
89. 129 US 677 (1889).
90. Chapman, 129 US at 682.
1991 383
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the district court of the United States for the Northern District of
Illinois."1 The United States Express Company also averred that
the company was authorized by state law to sue and be sued in the
name of its president, and that the company itself was a citizen of
New York."s The Court sua sponte considered the issue of whether
diversity jurisdiction was satisfied.'3 The Court stated that the
joint stock company was not a corporation, and therefore did not
come within the statute regulating diversity jurisdiction." The fact
that state law authorized the company to sue in the name of its
president, and that the company was organized under state law,
did not bring the joint stock company within the provisions of the
diversity statute." The Court went on to reason that the citizen-
ship of each member of the joint stock company had to be shown
in the record to be diverse from the Illinois defendant for diversity
jurisdiction to be satisfied."
In the second case, Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v
Jones,'7 a limited partnership association organized under Penn-
sylvania law brought suit against several defendants from states
other than Pennsylvania." In its bill, the limited partnership asso-
ciation described itself as a citizen of Pennsylvania." Under Penn-
sylvania law,100 the association could sue and be sued in its own
name. 01 The Court stated that, under the state law creating it, the
limited partnership could be described as a "quasi-corporation,"
having characteristics of both a corporation and a partnership.10'
91. Id at 677-78.
92. Id at 679.
93. Id at 681.
94. Id at 682. See discussion of Chapman in note 26. A joint stock company is an
unincorporated association which has some attributes of a corporation, namely the transfer-
ability of shares and centralized management by chosen representatives. Judson A. Crane,
Handbook on the Law of Partnership and other Unincorporated Associations 156 (West,
2d ed 1952). Members of a joint stock company are subject to personal liability on the asso-
ciation's obligations. Crane, Partnership at 157 (cited within this note).
95. Chapman, 129 US at 682.
96. Id.
97. 177 US 449 (1900).
98. Great Southern, 177 US at 450. A limited partnership association is formed ac-
cording to state law and possesses many attributes of a corporation. These attributes are
centralized management, transferability of shares, the right to sue and be sued, the ability
to own property, and limited liability of its members. Like a partnership, a limited partner-
ship association can be selective as to who may join as a members. Crane, Partnership 112-
13 (cited in note 94).
99. Great Southern, 177 US at 450.
100. 1 Brightly's Purdon's Digest Pa, Joint Stock Companies § 16 at 1088 (12th ed).
101. Great Southern, 177 US at 455.
102. Id at 456-57. See note 98.
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The Supreme Court found Chapman controlling, 1s and stated that
for diversity jurisdiction purposes, the citizenship of each member
of the limited partnership association had to be shown in the rec-
ord. 10' Because the association was not a corporation, 105 and be-
cause the citizenship of each member of the association was not
shown in the record, the corporation could not invoke federal juris-
diction.'" The Court stated that, although the association could
sue and be sued by the association name under state law, this fact
did not entitle the association to treatment as a corporation for
purposes of jurisdiction.0 7 Recognizing the rule that corporations
are deemed citizens of their state of incorporation, the Court noted
that no such rule had been applied to limited partnership associa-
tions, even though those associations may somewhat resemble a
corporation.'"8
A third of a century later, Puerto Rico v Russell & Co.'"9 was
decided by the Supreme Court. In Russell, the people of Puerto
Rico brought suit against a sociedad en comandita, an association
organized under the laws of Puerto Rico, the membership of which
contained no citizens or domiciles of Puerto Rico.110 The suit was
originally brought in the Insular Court of Puerto Rico, but the de-
fendants removed the case to the United States District Court for
Puerto Rico.' Under the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, the United
States District Court of Puerto Rico has, in addition to the usual
jurisdiction conferred on federal district courts, jurisdiction of
103. Id at 455.
104. Id at 458.
105. Id at 454.
106. Id at 454-55. See discussion of Great Southern in note 26.
107. Id at 455-56.
108. Id at 456.
109. 288 US 476 (1933).
110. Russell, 288 US at 477.
111. Id at 477. The District Court of Puerto Rico is a territorial court, as opposed to a
constitutional court. United States v Montanez, 371 F2d 79, 83 (2d Cir 1967). A constitu-
tional court is one that derives its authority from Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution,
while a territorial court, also called a legislative court, derives its authority from another
section of the Constitution, such as Article IV, § 3, cl 2, which authorizes Congress to enact
necessary legislation as to the territories of the United States. Montanez, 371 F2d at 82, 83.
Besides deriving its authority from other than Article III, territorial courts differ from con-
stitutional courts in that the judges on constitutional courts hold tenure during good behav-
ior, and cannot have their salary diminished, as provided for in Article III. Wright, Federal
Courts 30 (cited in note 66). The judges on Puerto Rico's District Court at one time served
for only eight years, but since Congress enacted legislation in 1966, the judges enjoy life
tenure. Montanez, 371 F2d at 83; Pub L No 89-571, 80 Stat 764 (Sept 12 1966), 28 USC §
134(a) (Supp 1966).
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suits "where all of the parties on either side of the controversy are
citizens of a foreign State or States, or Citizens of a State, Terri-
tory or District of the United States not domiciled in Puerto Rico
. . ." and where the amount in controversy requirement is met.",2
The Supreme Court considered whether the members of the socie-
dad were "parties" under the Organic Act. If so, and because of
their non-residence in Puerto Rico, removal to the United States
District Court for Puerto Rico was proper, and diversity of citizen-
ship would be unnecessary.11 3 But the Court found that the proper
party in the proceeding was the sociedad itself and not its individ-
ual members because, under the civil law of Puerto Rico, the socie-
dad was "consistently regarded as a juridical person." ' Referring
to the situation of corporations, the Court stated that the rule re-
garding corporations as citizens of their state of incorporation for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction resulted from the "complete legal
personality" conferred on them by state law.11 6 The Court rea-
soned that because the sociedad's "personality [was] so complete
in contemplation of the law of Puerto Rico," it was to be treated as
112. Organic Act of Puerto Rico, 18 USCA §§ 863, 864 (1948). This additional jurisdic-
tion is conferred on the District Court for Puerto Rico despite its definition as a "court of
the United States." 28 USCA § 451 (West 1968).
113. Russell, 288 US at 478. Because the plaintiff was the government of Puerto Rico,
the defendant could not have availed himself of diversity jurisdiction as provided in the
United States Constitution. Puerto Rico, as a party in the suit and a territory, is not a
citizen of a state as required by the diversity statute. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v Alabama, 155
US 482, 487 (1894). See also, United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v Bouligny, 336
F2d 160, 162, n.1 (4th Cir 1961).
114. Russell, 288 US at 480-81. Under the civil law of Puerto Rico, the Court noted
that a sociedad
may contract, own property and transact business, sue and be sued in its own name
and right. . .Its members are not thought to have a sufficient personal interest in a
suit brought against the entity to entitle them to intervene as parties defendant...
It is created by articles of association filed as public records. . .Where the articles so
provide, the sociedad endures for a period prescribed by them regardless of the death
or withdrawal of individual members..
Certain members are vested with
powers of management.. . and they alone may perform acts legally binding on the
sociedad. . . Its members are not primarily liable for its acts and debts ... , and its
creditors are preferred with respect to its assets and property over the creditors of
individual members, although the latter may reach the interests of the individual
members in the common capital... (Tihe members whose participation is unlimited
are made contingently liable for the debts of the sociedad in the event that its assets
are insufficient to satisfy them,. . . [but] this liability is of no more consequence for
present purposes than that imposed on corporate stockholders by the statutes of
some states.
Id at 480 (citations omitted).
115. Id at 479.
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a corporation for purposes of federal jurisdiction and deemed a cit-
izen of Puerto Rico for purposes of the Organic Act."'
Thirty years after Russell, in United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO v R.H. Bouligny, Inc.," the Supreme Court once again
had to decide whether an association other than a corporation
could be considered a "citizen" under the diversity statute. In Bou-
ligny, a North Carolina corporation brought an action against an
unincorporated labor union in a North Carolina state court."'8 The
labor union removed the action to federal court, alleging that di-
versity jurisdiction was satisfied because it was a citizen of Penn-
sylvania, even though some of the union members were citizens of
the same state as the plaintiff. 19 Relying on "the generally prevail-
ing principle" that each member's citizenship of an unincorporated
association must be considered to determine the existence of diver-
sity jurisdiction, the North Carolina corporation sought to have the
case remanded to the state court, but the district court refused. 2 °
Noting a trend to treat unincorporated associations for diversity
jurisdiction purposes as corporations, the district judge refused to
follow the rule of Chapman.12' The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court on interlocutory appeal,
and remanded the case to the state court. 22 On certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court, the sole issue was whether an unin-
corporated labor union was to be considered a citizen in determin-
ing whether diversity jurisdiction was satisfied. 2 '
The Court found persuasive the labor union's argument that the
distinction between corporations and unincorporated associations
has become "artificial and unreal" in light of the functions and
structure of the associations."14 This was especially true, said the
Court, in the present case, in which the expansion of diversity ju-
risdiction to include labor unions would fulfill the original purpose
116. Id at 482. The Court did not hold that the sociedad was to be deemed a citizen
for purposes of the diversity statute under Article III of the United States Constitution. See
Bouligny, 336 F2d 160, 163 (4th Cir 1964).
117. 382 US 145 (1965).
118. Bouligny, 382 US at 146.
119. Id. The labor union also alleged that the action, based on the National Labor
Relations Act, arose under the laws of the United States, but the Fourth Circuit found that
no federal question jurisdiction existed. Bouligny, 336 F2d 160, 164-65 (4th Cir 1964).
120. Bouligny, 382 US at 146.
121. Id. The district judge termed Chapman's rule as "poorer reasoned" and against
"common sense." Id.
122. Id.
123. Id at 147.
124. Id at 149-50.
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of the diversity statue-to protect the non-resident party from
prejudice in the local courts. 121 However, the Court decided that
any expansion of diversity jurisdiction to include previously uncov-
ered groups, such as unincorporated labor unions, should be left to
Congress."" Congress would best be able to formulate a rule to ac-
commodate unions for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
1 2 7
In response to the labor union's argument that the rule estab-
lished in Chapman was no longer sound in light of the Court's de-
cision in Russell, the Court distinguished the sociedad en co-
mandita involved in Russell from other associations, stating that
the sociedad was, under the civil law of Puerto Rico, consistently
treated as a "juridical person.1128 The Court stated that the pur-
pose of its decision in Russell was to prevent non-residents of Pu-
erto Rico from forming such organizations to do business there,
and then removing controversies grounded in local law from Pu-
erto Rico's Insular Court to the district court. 2 ' The Court also
stated that Russell did not expand diversity jurisdiction because,
as Puerto Rico was not a "State" in terms of the diversity statute,
the sociedad could not have invoked diversity jurisdiction under
the general diversity statute, but only in accordance with the terms
of the Organic Act of Puerto Rico.
130
When presented with a situation involving a business trust fif-
teen years after Bouligny, the Court did not follow the incorpo-
rated/unincorporated dichotomy it had established in Chapman,
Great Southern, and Bouligny. In Navarro Savings Association v
Lee,1 381 the individual trustees of a business trust organized under
Massachusetts law brought suit against a Texas corporation. 13  Al-
though each of the trustees was a citizen of a state other than
125. Id at 150. The labor union, in support of its argument, had introduced evidence
that a union's organization campaign, as in the present case, aroused "economic and racial
fears" in a locality. It was argued that allowing labor unions into the federal courts would
derive benefits from a more impartial judge and jury, as well as a "more effective review" by
the United States Supreme Court. Id.
126. Id at 150-51.
127. Id at 152. The Court was hesitant to form such a rule from Bouligny for fear that
the record and case itself were not conducive for such a necessarily generalized rule. Id. The
Court was unsure what kind of test would be necessary to determine the state of citizenship
of unions, which usually have local as well as national organizations. Id at 152-53. The Court
compared this dilemma to the rule for corporations, which have a natural reference point to
their state of incorporation for purposes of "citizenship." Id at 152.
128. Id at 151.
129. Id at 152, n.10.
130. Id at 152. See note 113.
131. 446 US 458 (1980).
132. Navarro, 446 US at 459.
Vol. 29:373
Recent Decisions
Texas, some of the trust's beneficial shareholders were citizens of
Texas.1 33 The district court dismissed the action because it consid-
ered the citizenship of the trust's beneficiaries and found complete
diversity lacking.1 34 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed, holding that the trustees were the only real parties in inter-
est because of their power to manage and control the trust and to
bring suit on its behalf, and so only the citizenship of the trustees
was to be considered for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.1 3 6 On
certiorari to the Supreme Court, the issue to be decided was
whether only the citizenship of the trustees of a business trust was
to be considered for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, without re-
gard to the citizenship of the trust's beneficiaries.
The Court began its analysis by stating that one must be a real
party to the controversy to be considered for diversity jurisdiction
purposes, and that "a federal court must disregard nominal or for-
mal parties ... .""6 The Court recognized that, while corporations
have long been deemed to be citizens, "unincorporated associations
remain mere collections of individuals. When the 'persons compos-
ing such associations' sue in their collective name, they are the
parties whose citizenship determines the diversity jurisdiction of a
federal court."137
The Court then distinguished the present situation by stating
that the business trust was neither a corporation nor an unincorpo-
rated association.'" To resolve the issue of whose citizenship was
determinative of diversity jurisdiction, the Court turned to a rule
established in 1808 by the Supreme Court providing that the trust-
ees of a business trust "are entitled to bring diversity actions in
their own names and upon the basis of their own citizenship."'13'
133. Id at 460.
134. Id. The district court "[c]onclud[ed] that a business trust is a citizen of every
State in which its shareholders reside." Id. See note 19.
135. Navarro, 446 US at 460.
136. Id. The Court cites McNutt v Bland, 43 US (2 How) 9 (1844) for these proposi-
tions. In McNutt, three New York citizens sued a Mississippi citizen in the name of the
governor of Mississippi. McNutt, 43 US at 10. They did so because the governor held a
bond, to assure the faithful performance of the sheriff's duties, on which the plaintiffs were
attempting to recover. Id at 9. The Court said that the New York citizens were the "real and
only plaintiffs," and jurisdiction should not be denied because the governor was "a purely
naked trustee.. . . [He] cannot prevent the institution or prosecution of the suit, nor has he
any control over it .. " Id at 13-14.
137. Navarro, 446 US at 461 (quoting Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel, Co. v Jones,
177 US 449, 456 (1900); Steelworkers v Bouligny, Inc., 382 US 145 (1965); and Chapman v
Barney, 129 US 677 (1889)).
138. Navarro, 446 US at 462.
139. Id. The Court cites Chappedelaine v Dechenaux, 4 Cranch 306, 308 (1808) as the
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The Court stated that when a trustee has the power to manage the
trust to benefit the beneficiaries, then the trustee's citizenship is
considered for purposes of diversity jurisdiction because he is the
real party to the controversy.""0 The Court concluded that because
the trustees in the instant case held legal title to the trust's assets,
were able to invest the assets to benefit the shareholders, and
could sue and be sued in their own names as trustees, then in ac-
cordance with the rule established in 1808 mentioned above, they
were the real parties to the controversy.14'
Following the Court's decision in Navarro, a majority of the cir-
cuit courts have held that the incorporated/unincorporated dichot-
omy established in Chapman applies to suits involving limited
partnerships. 42 That is, the citizenship of all members of a limited
partnership, both general and limited partners, is to be considered
to determine whether diversity jurisdiction exists. The reasons
given by the circuit courts are varied: Navarro is expressly limited
to express trusts;" the Court in Navarro affirmed the rule estab-
lished in Chapman and cited with approval the Great Southern
decision;' 4 the Court in Navarro expressly rejects an attempt to
case establishing this rule. Chappedelaine involved two plaintiffs-a residuary legatee and
the administrator of a Georgia decedent's estate-who sued the executor of another Georgia
decedent's estate for an accounting. Chappedelaine, 4 Cranch at 306. On writ of error to the
Supreme Court, the defendant assigned as error that, although the complainants were al-
leged to be French citizens and the defendant alleged to be a citizen of Georgia, the court
lacked jurisdiction because the two decedents were citizens of Georgia. Id at 307. Chief Jus-
tice Marshall found that diversity jurisdiction was satisfied because "the plaintiffs were
aliens and, suing as trustees, were entitled to invoke federal jurisdiction." Id at 308.
140. Navarro, 446 US at 464. The Court cited Bullard v Cisco, 290 US 179 (1933) for
this proposition. In Bullard, holders of bonds and coupons transferred them to a committee
according to a bondholders protective agreement. Bullard, 290 US at 181. The committee
brought suit to collect on the bonds and coupons. Id at 180. The Court held that the citizen-
ship of the committee members was to be considered for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
Although the agreement did not designate it as such, the Court found that an "express
trust" had been created: the committee members were the trustees and the original bond
and coupon holders were the beneficiaries. Id at 189.
141. Navarro, 446 US at 464-65.
142. See SHR Limited Partnership v Braun, 888 F2d 455 (6th Cir 1989); Alexander
Proudfoot Co. World Headquarters v Thayer, 877 F2d 912 (11th Cir 1989); Stouffer Corp. v
Breckenridge, 859 F2d 75 (8th Cir 1988); New York State Teachers Retirement System v
Kalkus, 764 F2d 1015 (4th Cir 1985); Elston Inv. Ltd. v David Altman Leasing Corp., 731
F2d 436 (7th Cir 1984); Trent Realty Associates v First Fed. Say. & Loan Association, 657
F2d 29 (3d Cir 1981).
143. Trent Realty Associates v First Fed. Say. & Loan Association, 657 F2d 29, 32 (3d
Cir 1981); New York State Teachers Retirement System v Kalkus, 764 F2d 1015, 1018 (4th
Cir 1984). See notes 72 and 73 and accompanying text.
144. Elston Inv. Ltd. v David Altman Leasing Corp., 731 F2d 436, 437 (7th Cir 1984).
See note 169 and accompanying text.
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analogize a limited partnership to a business trust; 46 Navarro is
decided exclusively by reliance on a settled rule that allows trust-
ees of an express business trust to sue on behalf of its beneficiaries
without regard to their citizenship. 1 6
One circuit court, however, has interpreted the Court's decision
in Navarro to mandate the application of a "real party to the con-
troversy" test in situations involving limited partnerships to deter-
mine which parties' citizenship is determinative of diversity juris-
diction, and has held that a limited partner's citizenship is
irrelevant for diversity jurisdiction purposes.
14 7
The dissent in Carden also found that the "real party to the
controversy" analysis employed in Navarro should be applied to
situations involving limited partnerships.14 8 However, the majority
correctly recognized the distinction between corporations and un-
incorporated associations developed in Chapman, Great Southern,
and Bouligny, and thus is more consonant with Supreme Court
precedent than is the dissent. This trilogy of cases clearly demon-
strates that only incorporated entities are considered "citizens" for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction. This writer ponders, however,
why the majority did not rely on the fact that the diversity statute
explicitly provides for the "citizenship" of corporations only, with-
out regard to unincorporated associations.14' The majority in
Carden simply deferred to Congress to enlarge the reach of the
diversity statute, without considering that amendment of the juris-
dictional statute would necessarily be a purely legislative function.
The majority's attempt to distinguish the situation in Russell
from that presented in Carden may be criticized as inadequate.
The Court merely stated that the association involved in Russell,
the sociedad en comandita, was an "exotic creation of the civil
145. Elston, 731 F2d at 438. See note 172 and accompanying text.
146. Kalkus, 764 F2d at 1018. See note 169 and accompanying text.
147. Mesa Operating Ltd. Partnership v Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp., 797 F2d 238
(5th Cir 1986). In Mesa, the Fifth Circuit analogized a limited partnership to the business
trust in Navarro, and held that, because the general partners held all control over the part-
nership, they were real parties to the controversy and only their citizenship would deter-
mine whether diversity jurisdiction exists. Mesa, 797 F2d at 240, 242.
The Second Circuit in Colonial Realty Corp. v Bache & Co., 358 F2d 178 (2d Cir 1966),
cert denied, 385 US 817, reached the same result as the court in Mesa, but applied New
York partnership law to determine that limited partners were not real parties to the contro-
versy, thus holding their citizenship irrelevant for diversity jurisdiction purposes. Colonial
Realty, 358 F2d at 183. The Colonial Realty decision occurred before the decision in
Navarro.
148. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1026. See note 48 and accompanying text.
149. See note 9.
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law," and its relationship to the "federal scheme" was unknown."'
The Court seemed to imply that the situation in Russell called for
an exception to the general rule that unincorporated associations
are not considered citizens for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
This simply was not the case in Russell. The Court should have
distinguished Russell on the stronger basis that it did not involve
the application of the diversity statute, but the application of the
Organic Act of Puerto Rico.15 1
The majority in Carden as well could have distinguished the
Navarro case more clearly. In order to do so, the majority should
have explicitly stated that a situation involving an express trust
calls for the application of a rule entirely different from that ap-
plied when the situation involves a corporation or an unincorpo-
rated association. Although the majority did say that Navarro was
decided in accordance with a rule established 150 years before,
that trustees of a business trust may sue in their own name with-
out regard to the citizenship of the beneficiaries, the Court in
Carden should have been more explicit regarding the historically
different treatment of trusts, as opposed to corporations/unincor-
porated associations, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.1 5 2
The dissent in Carden stated that the Court should have applied
a "real party to the controversy" test to the limited partnership,
because the Court has previously used the same approach in regard
to business associations.'"5 The dissent cited Bank of the United
States v Deveaux"' and Marshall v Baltimore & Ohio R. Co."6' as
the first decisions by the Court in which the "real party to the
controversy" test was used;'" however, a close reading of these
cases reveals that the test was not applied in those cases.
In Deveaux, the Court decided that the citizenship of all mem-
bers of a corporation is to be considered for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction, but not as a result of the application of the "real party
to the controversy" test. Rather, the Court reasoned that the cor-
poration merely "represents" its members, "and the controversy
[was], in fact and in law, between those persons suing in their cor-
porate character, by their corporate name, for a corporate right,
150. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1018. See note 29 and accompanying text.
151. See discussion of Russell at notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
152. See discussion of Navarro at note 169 and accompanying text.
153. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1024.
154. 5 Cranch 61, 3 L Ed 38 (1809).
155. 16 How 314, 14 L Ed 953 (1854).
156. See note 45 and accompanying text.
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and the individual against whom the suit may be instituted. ' 18 7
The Court did not consider which members of the corporation con-
trolled the business or the litigation, characteristics which the dis-
sent in Carden urged to be indicative of the real parties to the
controversy.'"
In Marshall, as well, the Court did not apply a "real party to the
controversy" test. In fact, the Court expressly refused to use the
test, finding that the averment that the defendant was a corpora-
tion of Maryland was sufficient to show the citizenship of the par-
ties in light of its holding that a corporation's shareholders are pre-
sumed to be citizens of the state of incorporation. 15 The Court did
not, as the dissent in Carden stated, "consider which citizens held
control over the business decisions and assets of the corporation
and over the initiation and course of litigation involving the corpo-
ration." 60 The holding in Marshall is worth repeating, that the
shareholders of a corporation are to be presumed to be citizens of
the state of incorporation. With this presumption in mind, it is
clear that the Court in Marshall based its diversity jurisdiction on
the citizenship of the shareholders, presumed to be citizens of the
state of incorporation, rather than on the "citizenship" of the cor-
poration itself, as the dissent in Carden erroneously stated.161 The
Court in Marshall stated that because the citizenship of the par-
157. Deveaux, 5 Cranch at 87-88.
158. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1026. The majority in Carden also found that Deveaux was
not decided by the application of the "real party to the controversy" test:
Deveaux .. .[applied] the principle that for jurisdictional purposes the corporation
has no substance, and merely 'represents' its shareholders; but even if it can be re-
garded as applying a 'real party to the controversy' test, it deems that test to be met
by all the shareholders of the corporation, without regard to their 'control over the
operation of the business'.
Id at 1020 (citations omitted).
159. Marshall, 16 How at 329.
160. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1024.
161. Id. The dissent in Carden erroneously stated that the Court in Marshall deter-
mined that the corporation itself, and not its members, controlled corporate decisions, as-
sets, and litigation. Id. The majority opinion in Carden as well failed to notice that the
Court in Marshall considered the presumed citizenship of the shareholders rather than the
"citizenship" of the corporation. The majority in Carden, rather than finding that Marshall
supports its holding, attempted to distinguish Marshall by stating that its "analysis was a
complete fiction; the real citizenship of the shareholders. . . was not consulted at all." Id at
1020. This writer finds that Marshall supports the majority opinion in Carden because the
Court in Marshall did not apply the "real party to the controversy" test to determine which
parties' citizenship should be counted for diversity jurisdiction purposes. The majority in
Carden, however, conceded to the dissent's point of view that Marshall "contains language
quite clearly adopting a 'real party to the controversy' approach, and arguably even adopt[s]
a 'control' test for that status." Id.
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ties could be "presumed or legally inferred" from the averment
that the defendant corporation was incorporated in Maryland, the
declaration sufficiently showed the citizenship of the parties." 2
That the Court considered the presumed citizenship of the share-
holders is evidenced in the following passage from the Marshall
opinion:
If the declaration sets forth facts from which the citizenship of the parties
may be presumed or legally inferred, it is sufficient. The presumption aris-
ing from the habitat of a corporation in the place of its creation being con-
clusive as to the residence or citizenship of those who use the corporate
name and exercise the faculties conferred by it, the allegation that the "de-
fendants are a body corporate by the Act of the General Assembly of Mary-
land," is a sufficient averment that the real defendants are citizens of that
State.0 0
The dissent found that Chapman, Great Southern, and Bouli-
gny supported its view that the "real party to the controversy" test
should be applied in Carden. The dissent claimed that, in those
cases, "the Court was not called upon to determine which of the
citizens before it were the real parties to the controversy because
the business associations were not citizens themselves and the
members of each association held equivalent power and control
over the association's assets, business, and litigation."'"
The dissent is disillusioned about the Court's analysis in Chap-
man, Great Southern, and Bouligny. The Court in those three
cases did not approach the issues presented as the dissent in
Carden claimed. For the dissent to have stated that the Court did
not have to apply the "real party to the controversy" test in those
decisions, because the entities themselves were not citizens and be-
cause the members of each entity held equal control over the busi-
ness, is to ignore the reasoning in those decisions and to ignore the
facts in those cases as well.
The analysis suggested by the dissent in Carden simply cannot
be found in Chapman, Great Southern, or Bouligny. In each case,
upon determining that the association before them was not a cor-
poration, and thus not a citizen, the Court went no further. Apply-
ing that single criteria, the Court held that each member's citizen-
ship had to be counted. There was not, as the dissent stated in
Carden, a two-pronged test. The individual characteristics and
powers of the members of the entities involved in Chapman, Great
162. Marshall, 16 How at 329.
163. Id (emphasis added).
164. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1025.
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Southern, and Bouligny were not considered by the Court in
reaching its determination that each member's citizenship had to
be counted for diversity jurisdiction purposes. Obviously, the
Court did not find such considerations relevant, because they were
not even mentioned in the opinions. As the majority in Carden
said: "[n]o doubt some members of the joint stock company in
Chapman, the labor union in Bouligny, and the limited partner-
ship association in Great Southern exercised greater control over
their respective entities than other members. But such considera-
tions have played no part in our decisions."""
The dissent referred to the Court's decision in Navarro, stating
that the application of the "real party to the controversy" test was
there appropriate.1 "6 By analogy, the dissent claimed that the "real
party to the controversy" test applied in Navarro should be ap-
plied as well to situations involving limited partnerships."' How-
ever, the majority stated that Navarro involved "the distinctive
common-law institution of trustees,"1" and this writer must agree
with the majority that an altogether different analysis was called
for in Navarro that is not relevant to situations involving corpora-
tions or unincorporated associations.
The Court in Navarro began its analysis by stating that the suit
brought by the individual trustees of a business trust "involve[d]
neither an association nor a corporation."169 Immediately, one is
alerted that the Court will apply an analysis different from that
applicable to corporations and unincorporated associations. The
Court, before facing the situation presented involving a business
trust, cited with approval the rules governing corporations and un-
incorporated associations:
Although corporations suing in diversity have long been "deemed" citizens,
... unincorporated associations remain mere collections of individuals.
When the "persons composing such association" sue in their collective
name, they are the parties whose citizenship determines the diversity juris-
165. Id at 1020. Indeed, in Chapman, the president of the joint stock company was the
lone party able to sue and be sued on behalf of the company. Chapman, 129 US at 679.
Although this additional power conferred on the president was clearly reflected in the rec-
ord, and thus distinguished the president from the other members of the company, the
Court took no notice of this unequal distribution of power among the members of the
company.
166. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1026.
167. Id. "Like the trust beneficiary in Navarro, the limited partner 'can neither con-
trol the disposition of this action nor intervene in the affairs of the trust except in the most
extraordinary situations."' Id (quoting Navarro, 446 US at 464-65).
168. Carden, 110 S Ct at 1020.
169. Navarro, 446 US at 462.
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diction of a federal court.'7 0
Despite the dissent's contention in Carden, Navarro does not call
for the application of a "real party to the controversy" test to cases
involving unincorporated associations; rather, Navarro affirms the
majority's holding in Carden that all members of an unincorpo-
rated association, including limited partnerships, must be consid-
ered for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
Navarro was decided according to a long-established rule that
"trustees of an express trust are entitled to bring diversity actions
in their own names and upon the basis of their own citizenship. '171
The Navarro opinion is littered with citations to cases involving
trusts,1 7 2 giving substance to the assertion that, when it comes to
determining whose citizenship is to be counted for purposes of di-
versity jurisdiction, trusts stand apart from both corporations and
unincorporated associations.
More direct evidence that Navarro is limited in application only
to trusts is the fact that the Court in Navarro expressly said as
much:
The Court never has analogized express trusts to business entities for pur-
poses of diversity jurisdiction. Even when the Court espoused the view that
a corporation lacked citizenship, . . . Mr. Chief Justice Marshall explained
that the doctrine had no bearing on the status of trustees.
When [persons suing by a corporate name] are said to be substantially the
parties to the controversy, the court does not mean to liken it to the case of
a trustee. A trustee is a real person capable of being a citizen. . . who has
the whole legal estate in himself. At law, he is the real proprietor, and he
represents himself, and sues in his own right."'
Even the dissent in Navarro found that the majority's opinion had
no application to situations involving limited partnerships.1 74
The majority's opinion in Carden was wholly predictable from
170. Id at 461 (citing Great Southern, 177 US at 456).
171. Navarro, 446 US at 462. See the discussion of Navarro starting at note 131 and
accompanying text.
172. Navarro, 446 US at 460, 464. See notes 136 and 140, referring to McNutt v
Bland, 2 How 9, 11 L Ed 159 (1844), and Bullard v Cisco, 290 US 179 (1933). Both cases
contained situations involving trusts.
Other cases cited in Navarro involving trust situations, where legal and equitable title are
essentially separated, are Coal Company v Blatchford, 11 Wall 172, 20 L Ed 179 (1871);
Bonnafee v Williams, 3 How 574, 11 L Ed 732 (1845); and Dodge v Tulleys, 144 US 451
(1892).
173. Navarro, 446 US at 463, n.10 (citing Deveaux, 5 Cranch at 91).
174. Navarro, 446 US at 475, n.6: "I read the Court's opinion in this case as expressing




the development of the case law. The Court established an incor-
porated/unincorporated dichotomy in Chapman, involving a joint
stock company, and in each subsequent case involving an unincor-
porated association (Great Southern involving a limited partner-
ship association, and Bouligny involving an unincorporated labor
union), the Court determined that, because of the association's un-
incorporated status, each member's citizenship was determinative
of diversity jurisdiction. Thus, when presented with the situation
in Carden involving an unincorporated limited partnership, the
Court was bound to consider the citizenship of each member of the
limited partnership, both limited and general partners.
The case law also shows the development of a different test to be
applied in situations involving trusts. The analysis used in
Navarro, a case which involved an express business trust, cannot
be applied to situations involving an unincorporated association.
The effect of the decision in Carden is to severely limit a limited
partnership's access to federal court. Although Carden involved an
association containing only one limited partner, limited partner-
ships do exist where membership contains numerous limited part-
ners. By necessarily determining the citizenship of each limited
partner for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, chances are that re-
lief will have to be sought in state court.
The larger the limited partnership, the greater the possibility
that the partnership will be precluded from seeking a forum in fed-
eral court, unless another basis for federal jurisdiction exists. Ad-
vocates of abolishing or restricting diversity jurisdiction will per-
haps regard Carden as an attempt by the Supreme Court to limit
its own diversity jurisdiction. This writer firmly believes, however,
that Carden was decided strictly according to precedent without
regard to the effects on federal dockets, despite suspicions to the
contrary expressed by the strong four-justice dissent.17 5
Jan S. Barnett
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